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PREFACE.
In writing this Lhesis I
have endeavored to trace the growth of the law, and to give
some notion of how the courts now stancj,when treatin7
cases involving the Right of 3an&s to Recover 1,ioney Paid
out on Forged Indorsements.
Several able writers have devoted consicerable space
to the consideration of the subject and among them are Mr.
liorse,who has perhaps the best discussion; Ir.Daniel also
discusses it at some length in his work on Negotiable In-
struments, and in 0 American Law Review 411 is a well
written article.
In my treatment I have been obliged, in some instances
to rather closely follow the texts, for the reason that
the few leading cases have teen discussedcritisized, and
conm ented on, over and over again.
.S. T.
At L .e present day very few business traisactions of
importance are for cash; our civilization has done away
with payment in Aind and tne majority of business deal-
ings are of such a nature t.at ready money is not con-
venient and payment is made by a bill or chec4 drawn upon
some banking house of which the drawer or maker is a cts-
tomer.
This improved system of payment has given rise to a
comparatively new species of crime,and where formerly
our prisons were filled with men whose strange order of
genius had made it possible for them to imitate,almost to
perfection,our currency; now these later day geniuseses,
profiting by the experience of tLhir progenitors in crime
are a standing menace to our banks. Hardly a day passes
but some paper bearing a forged signaturt is innocently
discounted or paid. To finc when and from whom this money
can be recovered is the subject unler investigation.
And first as to what constitutes forgery,the dlefin-
ition which 14r. iDaniel adopts, and which he taxes from
Byles on Bills, is this: Forgery is the counterfeit makingo
of any paper with intent to defraud. Tuis seems to be a
good and comprehensive definition,including cases in
which one having authority to fill in an amount fraudu-
I
lently,fills in a larger amount. It may be noted here
that in this state one having authority to fill out
checks signed in blank, and exceeds his authority by
filling out a larger amount is not guilty of forgery,and
consequently my inference would be that the maker must, as
it is not a forgery, be liable for the full amnount.
The material alteration of a completed instrument is
a forgery.
As soon as a person or bank finds that he is tile
holder of the forged paper,iL is his duty to give notice
to the person from whom he received the instrument. Some
courts hold that this notice must be given immediately
but thle laterandT believemore -eneral rule is tCat
notice should be given wi .aout unreasonable celay. The
reason t -at this notice must be given is in order to allow
1. People vs.JAiMGz 7 Crf-i.[. 71.
2.DwioIt vs.Holuro , 1 Aln at 5.
tae person prectding tiiv holder - Lei man wao gave ni1 tue
insLr-mmnt - to nave a ahance toindemnify .himse.f. ACCor-
uinIg to Lajjizl waii sabre is aw] &naorser on tat instru-
ment who is entitled to notic , ti demand must be made in
time for tne holUer of tae instrument to notify tau indor-
ser. And, also accord-i,: to tue s ime auLtority,he mtUst,un-
less Lte instrument is an utter forj.ry, an(u absoluLely
worthlessreturn the paper so that trie party rtsponeible
to him can Ta~c the best of it.
But the time within which notice must be given to
allow a recovery nas not been definittly setLied; tae rule
seems to be witnin a reasonable time after the forg-ry is
discovered, and some of tne cases limit this time to tne
day upon wllici iL was discovuru. Otaers,.or liberalnavu
allowed several days. 3ut it does not follow from the
above tuat tie forgery must be discovered at once,after
ttie customer tias receivet tne checx, as in a late 'ew Yor
1
case forgeries were goinj on for a periou of four ;~r-;
periodical settlements were Lc.in- -: ade,and still,wlien t'-e
forgzery was discovei'tu t'.e court elo tiiit t,,e plaintiff
1. 126 N.Y. 209
had given notice as soon as the forgery was discovered and
and that that was sufficient.
ThV writer of an able article in Tne ].rioan Law He-
view Uivides tiie cases whici we ar- about to consider
into two classes: first, actions brought by tlie holders of
paper against parties whom t ey claim to be liable, second
actions brought to recover money paid by one party to
another under mutual mistake of facts. The one party at
the time supposing facts to exist which maKe him lia>le to
pay, and tnie other party supposing facts to exist which
entitle him to reciiv6 the amount paid.
Probably the first leauing case decideu along this
line was that of Price vs. Neale decided by Lord 1.ans-
2
fielu in 1762. It is trut taat in Jenys vs. Fawler, Loru
Raymond, ta: then Chief Justice, inclined strongly to the
belief that even actual proof of for ery of the name of
tae drawer woulu no; excuse tnt defindants against t:iir
acceptance, becausc of the danger to ne7otidble notes.
3ut the peculiar notion advanceu in tais case of
ignoring the very existence of forve( paper was soon
1. 9 Am.L.Rev.411. 2. 3 Burrows 1355. 3. 2 Stran-e. 946.
dropped.
It was not until Price vs. Neale ttat the rule was
definitely laid down, but it must have existed before, even
if not written in the boos,or Lord K'an!field would not
have summarily closed tae case saying it was one of
those which could never be made any plainer by argument.
i
The case was this: the dmount sought to be recovered
was the combined sum of two bills of exchange drawn on the
plaintiff. The plainLiff paid the first bill when it was
presented to himwithout having previously accepted it.
The drawers signature was forged. As to te other,it was
drawn in the same name as the first,was accepted, and after
acceptance it came into the hands of tne same innocent
holder for value. The two bills are entirely different.
In the first the plaintiff never promised to pay the
forged bill but did pay it; in the second tne plaintiff
paid, after having accepteda forged bill.
2
"The defendant,Neale, acted innocently and bona
fides,without the least privity or suspicion of the forg-
eries or eitaer of them, and paid tie whole value of those
1. 9 Am. L. Rev. 411. 2. 3 3urr. 1354.
bills." Lord Mansfield stopped the argument saying:"Tt is
an action for money had and receivtd to t,, plaintiffs's
In which action the plaintiff cannot recover the money
unless it be against conscience in the defendant to retain
it,aid great liberty is always allowd in tifis sort of
action.' The broad rule thus laid down is practically
this: " T ie baner is bound to icnow t~ie hand writing of
his customer; the drawee is bound to know tre signature of
his drawerwhence it follows that if the banker or drawee
maxes a payment or gives credit on the strengtrh of a
forged signature, the loss must be his as between himself
and the depositor. The blunder is his; he has not ,,nown
what he is bound to know. Having parteo with his money
by means of his own culpable negligence,he cannot be per-
mitted to recover it back again when he afterwards dis-
covers his error-
I have paid perhaps more than necessary attention to
the case of Price vs. Nealeand have dwelt too long upon
the primary rule developed by it. But it is this case
which first, in express terms lays down the rule,w -Acja with
1. Morse on Banking 328.
slight variation, or as Mr.jLorsu srys " paring down "exists
to day. It is of this case and rule t;.at Mr. Justice
I
Story says: " It has neve.r been departed from,and' in all
taee subsequent decisions in wnich it nas been cited it has
been deemed a satisfactory authority".
Tne rule laiu down in Price vs. Neale,has,not,.iln-
standing Judge Story, been very seriously departed from
and much criticisud,and the modern tendency seems to be,
while not entirely to depart from itto limit it to a
great extent,so L;iat it is now safe to say thiat tue rule,
broad and all-including as it is to be inferred from the
decision of Lord iansfielu is no longer law. Judge Phelps
of Vermont spoke truly wien %k saic that t;e rule was too
sweeping, according to the modern interpretation of ttie law
Many cases have been decided erroniously and unwisely
by applying tie rule wrien tne facts did not warrant iG,
and such decisions have aad a tenuency to rnaie tfe rule
doubtedwhen in fact not thie rule but the application was
at fault. As an illustration of the above the following
case bears witness. While not strictly in point tie case
1. 6 U.S. 423.
of the 3ristol Knife Company vs. The First National 3ankc
1
of Hartford is in the same line,and is,to my mind,one of
tae most glaring instances of injustice in thie history of
jurisprudence.
The treasurer of the plaintiff sent a 7-essen?er to a
ban&c in another city -w .ere t ey had an-account-with a
checK, indorsed by theme nclosed in a sealed envelope. The
plaintiffs at the time knew that the messenger was given
to intoxication and was generally untrustworthy. On the
way tae messenger took out the caeci, and presenting it to
tae bani,drew tae money anu abscondeu. In a suit brought
against the bank it was held that the plaintiffs could
recover.
This case can be traced directly to the line of cases
under discussion. Several cases are cited in tie briefs
which art in the books as illustrations of tne rule in
Price vs. Neale. But wliy should the banic recover? Is it
supposed to know intuitively that when a checx is
brought to its window by the messenger of a business
house he has torn up his directions and taken tae wrapper
1. 41 Conn. 421.
from around it? Is the bank at fault because it Days
value for a check indorsed in blank? Is it supposed to
know that the house sending it intended it for adeposit?
No. and it is this kind of cases that has re(uced ti-
law to almost a chaos. The earliest case decided on this
side of the water was that of Levy vs. Thie Bank of the
1
United States. In this case a forged checic, drawn upon
one bank had been accepted by the latter and carried to
the credit of tne plaintiff. O the refusal of the bank
afterwards to pay the amount suit was brought. The court
expressly held tne plaintiff entitleu to recover on the
ground that thie acceptance concludeu the defendant. The
case was a very streng one for the fraud was discovered
only a few hours after the receipt of ttIe check and imme-
diate notice given,but this seemed to have nG effect on
tiie decision "Some of the cases",said t-ie court, "hold txat
the acceptor is ound because the acceptance gives a
credit to the bill etc. But the modern cases certainly
notice anootlier reason for his liability whicK we tnintc has
much good sense in it,nam,,ely t~rat the acceptor is prm-
1.1 Binn 27 also 10 V'.T eatt.n 3I.
sumed to know trie drawer's ia:-,( writing, anm by nis accep-
tance to take this knowledge upon himself.
The language of t,.e above ca ,e is approved by t.ie
court in The Unite6 States Ban." vs. Banx of Georgia,
where is to be found a learned discussion of the earlier
cases. In concluding Judge Story says:"After some re-
search we hdve been una le to find a single case in which
tiue general doctrine tlnJS asserted has been sriacen or
even uoLbted." "Considering taen, as we do t;iat t;e (;oc-
trine is well estal-isiied;thiat t:-e acceptor is bound to
know tne liano writing of tie drawer, and cannot dfine ailm-
self from ne payment by a subsequ-ni discovery of Lhu
forgery,we are of tne opinion that the present case falls
directly within ta-is principle". The case in wnich this
la -gjuage was used was one in which a ba nau receivec
as genuine, forged notes purporting to be its om. anc' had
passed t:ie - to the crecit of a depositer in good f itn.
When they fount out the forgery they tried to recover but
it was -ielu that they were bound to t;, credit t us jiv:,
and tue notes muLL I e treate6 as cash.
1. 6 U. S. 431
It has often been held that the reason for holdin-
ba,. s liable is on account of t;iir neC{ligence in not
sufficiently scruunizing the bill or chec&,anu that
they had no business to pay he arount of the paper until
satisfieu that it conLained tte bona fide si-nature of
ti.eir customer. As for instance,in the case above, the
banx had no right to credit tiie notes to ttieir customer
until they were sure that the bills were in fact those
issued by the bank. And from this it follows that when-
ever t;.e payee or holder of a bill does tliat which will
throw the bank off its gLae,and will deter it from as
close an examination a' it otherwise would makethen such
i
payee or holder will be ' eld liable. A much cite(; case
on i point is trial o Tne Na,,ional BanK of North Am-
I
erica vs. 3angs. A lani tooc in a for-ed clieck drawn on
anotn.er banK antc paid face value for it. Te ban., 5nen
indorsed tr.e chieck and finally it reached the ban.< on
which it was drawn, tarough the clearing -ouse. Ab out
t.,irteen days later the bank,in settlin- with ius customer
turne(1 the chec.< over to him, and he imm~iiaLely )ronounce-c
1. 106 i.lass. 441.
it a forgery and returned it to the bank,who in turn.,at
once notifitu tue uefendant. In an action brought to rt-
cover t-.e money it was kield that the defendants must lose
theaamount of the check on the ground that the check in
question could not be given currency but by the deftnd-
ants indorsement. and that by thus in(;orsin- they had
given to the check a sort of character which warrante( it
into whosever hands it Trigit come, an(I thi ,of it :elf,hac
prevented the plaintiff bank from making as careful an
inspection of the check as $* ot,_erwise would. Th-e court
held tuat ti.is signature by tue dtf ndant puL the plain-
tiff banA off Lneir guard,an-L relievec. them of tie c;irze
of negligence whici some courts holo is the primary
reason for making t' e bank stand the loss. ,ccording to
1
Lr.Miorse, there is a gradual but sure tendency to throw
t'ie burden from tlle bank to t .e payee or holer, arc now
the principal question has come to be wviet 2 ,er or not he
he has done his duty. And fro7. this the interestin-
question has 7rown up of wmIt constitutec, negligence in
tue bank, and unoer wiat circumstances it will be held to
1. Morse on 3anking 331.
have used due care. All of these questions limit the rule
of Price vs. Neale.
But this question is very undecided. In Tae 3an4 of
Nortri America vs. 3angs t ie court seems to siift the bur-
den on tau payee,but otner courts,equally hi-a, still stick
to tne old rule.
A case much cited by the courts in their decisions
is t'iat of Te Bank of St. Albans vs. The Farmers and 1,e-
I
cdanics 3any, knci it seems to me to raise some of the
clouds whiCh seem to envElope tre question. Judge Phelps
in deliverin- his opinion saia that the case of Price vs.
Neale is now unuerstood to have proceced upon tae ground
Laat tne araw=e is bound to ,nov t.e writing of Iiis cor-
respondent, and, tnus understooQ!,i-s autnority las never
been questione(j. And altiough tcie applicability of tae
rule to a transfer of for-e: paper between oersons not
parties to it is in coubt,it ias nmvEr bun critisized
when trhe bill was paid by tne drawee,an( it applies as
well to a bill paiu on przsentment as to one presenteG and
afterwaros circulateU."
1. 10 it. 141.
The presentment of a bill to a drawee iF a direct
appeal to him to sanction or repudiate it. It i an in-
quiry as to its genuintness addressed to the party who,of
all ot!iers is supposed to know, a., to be the est a, 1- to
answer it." "lie is,rmoreover, L.u person to w~iuTo Lhu bill
itself points as the legitimate source of information to
others,and if ne were permitted to dishono- a bill after
havin- once honored itthe very foundation and confidence
in commercial paper would be sihaken".
I
Mr. Daniel advarces a theory of his own, whicn , m
says,"i, much better calculated to effectuate justice than
the doctrine of Man field and 'tory. -"When the holder has
rectivt the bill after its acceptance the acceptor stands
toward hi. as the warranttr of its :.uinen~ssand receiv-
ing the bill upon faith in Lhe accptor's rrpresentation,
tllere is obvious propriety in maintainin; his. right to
hoiu the acceptor abs.olutely }.ound. Inoiced tre acceptor,
tein-I the primary de.tor- stanus ju-t as the maer of a
promissory note. 3u, when the holicer of an unaccepted
hill Dresents it to the drawee for acceptance or payment
1. 2,i.,riel on Necotia le Instru - ,pts 379.
tt; vcry revr,r of Lriic rule woulu s LO apply; for Li
holder theii reprusents,in effect,to trae drawee triat hIe
hiolds tiit bill of the drawer and demands its acceptance
or payment as such. If jit indorses it,he warrant, its
gtiineness,aziu his very assertion of owntrs, ip is a uar-
anty of genuineness in it elf. Tiierefor ,s' utl t:
drawee pay it,or accept it on such presentment, ano( after-
warus discover taat it was for-ec ,.e should be permittec
to recover the anount fro,- t:le holder to whom he pays it,
or a, against to cispLge tae bin(,in,, fo-re of his. ac-
ceptance, provicec, ht acts with due diligence. And nie
furt: er says: " T., mistake of tht dravwee should always be
allowcc to ",e corrected unless L,.e noluer,a-tins ui'on
faith' and conficence irEuced by his. honorir tc (raft
v'orjlc be placed in a worse position Iy 3ccorcin:, sUch
privilege to Lim.
In closin-y i-_is CLicc'Sl;on,,-.r Daniel says t-at even
wrar tnit Jnural rulu ivich ! iave beior: suggestu he
does not believe in - is reco-rize( tier', ar cevea
exceptions to it. (1) v,.;- tie pay- r -ctivus t , money,
for the payee can bt no lo,-er by rtfundin money paic.
under sucL a forgtry,an( (e) w;ere eit;:er ty agrcuxient or
cot rse of business between parties, or a eniga] cu tom
the holder takes upon *iim relf th( (uty of exercisin- some
mate-ial caution to o-vent te fraud a(,m ly iis ne-]igent
iailLr-; ,,as contriLuLG to inuuce L:;. urawfo to act upon
t,.e paer as,,en:uine anc. to advance tie money upon it. An('
:, ma.,es a tniru ca:,e vi, 1 re t:. pries arc Llftual y in
fau i t.
I.
IK L 11iuna£ll v,-. !'ourt-, d i~l1 -,an& -ar-
rett,J. said:'The (i;ifficilty of disp(,sin of tLE question
consists neit!,ur in arrivinJ at the justice or commyon
sense of the case,nor in the obseurity of tre uncerlyin-
principlt. It is (.:batablt only because of .he cu:erfic-
ial conic era~ioI ,.hich t Qu je, h-i rucciv ;,and in
thie ab enct of a guici.- principl in o:,.e of t .arlier
cases. ?riec vs. e-ala- anr, bic-u;e of srx>, dicta in our
own cortf ,in xhich suLt:-&t criti-css L - - trf1 ca e
are completely overlooeud. "
In this case the oi1: cases, devLlo7ir- t .e rule are
1. 7 AP'. 138.
Lii]L i; XxinCu, ano Price vs. Ntalt is severely (calt
wil.,uLi uoctrine is calloQ extraoruinary a-c. no long=r
law either in or the UJnite- states and Chitty is
cite( to tear the court out in its proposition. Tie de-
i
cision in 3an. of Comm'iierce vs. Uirion '3ank "as thrown
aside as mere oliter (icta. And, in conclucin_,the Court
said that after carefully examinin all Lhe authorities. it
wa "posible to lay down any one clear anc compre itn.iv
rule,nor even any irle definite principle which would
solve all the questions arising under the sutject.
The language of Chitty,wr-ich the court seeTk(; to use
as sort of a light-houce an( which several of trhe text
writers, i;clucin,- Mr. Daniel,quote withT approbation is as
follows:" It nriy rt ob~erveu t .at tr .q iolct-r w;no otC(.
payrent carnot 1-e con .icerec a, havin'7 alLo-etiier shown
suIficient circbmspection; ieit, or. he cis.countec
or receivt(; tr1, instrun ent in Dajy:.;itL .av, -aCe more in-
qLirizs as Lu t; 7nlir-_ u tL .s:,:-; Gf
t u Qravtr or incorsers tLeL:selves. If ;.6 tjr.ouJ lit to
rely on tii€ bare representation of the party fro-. whom iie
1. 3 N.Y. 230.
took it,ttiere is no rji son that ht shoud profit by Lue
accidental payment when the loss haui already attached,, upon
himself,and why he shoud be allowe6 to retainrthe money
when by an immediate notice of the forery he is enal led
to procec againsL all the other parties,precisely the
same as if the payment had been made. Consequently the
payment to him has not in the least altered the situation
or occasioned any delay or prejucice. It sewn.s that of
late upon questions of this nature t'iese latter consid-
erations have influenced the court in determining whether
or not the money should be recovered bacx; anwc it will be
founi, on exacin,.; the otter cases that there i,;eru facts
affording a distinction and that upon attempting to recon-
cile triuji. they aru not in contradiction as might on first
view be supposec."
The latest case thlat T i v be 1 ie t" fli( tLt
1
of Janin vs. London and San Francisco 3an, ('ecided by
tne Supreme Court of California No. 19, 1891. In this case
tne plaintiff was a depositor- in LnC- d.fLuant's bank and
the defendant paid a large check purported to be drawn by
1. 34 Central Law Journal 49.
tae plaintiff but w.icn was in reality forgeu. Ti ctiecx
was pai on Iiay L9,1378, anti on S3pt-zibvr 1-,1 8 7 8 t e T:
fendant returned to plaintiff his pass book,whichi contain-
ed a statement of his account up to date, -inc ludin; trie
a-. ount paid out on .he forged cri c. Another stat- ment
was render;c tne plaintiff on Dec. 11, 1878. It was not
until Dec.28 tnat the plaintiff for tie first time com-
municated LO tin defendanlts his doubt as to tie genuinen-
ess of' trie checK,anc it was not until F lruary 1,1879 that
;, actually gavz, notice tnat the ctecl was a forgery. The
point of tae case seem5 to turn on tie negligence or
laches of thne plaintiff in not giving earlier notice to
...... t t- , a jorjcry. An I tnin t:ie
discussion i wir -in t.-- spirit,ii o stric !y wi-.in t1e
ttie letter of tle olci rule.
The cirec was payable to currency or bearer anc Lm
ban,, r-quiruci no signatur,. whn i L paic rim tie nmoney. As
some Mrol:Is elapu betwt. A. :ai of tmi c-1L, an u
and ta-. stalemient tL tie depositor it was UIeciedly im-
probable t'at tje anc could trac- and identify tie
swilulr, evtr1 if tie plainLifi tiau -ivei. in&.iuiaL- noLic-,
tii first L tateueit wa: pr, -nt,, to rii,,t t, it e
bill wa a forge.ry. T.i notice was evidently civen to
Lac ban,, as soon a, uiscove-ed, anu t-Le court held t, 1at trhe
baoi coulu rcovur noLing from tau plaintiff. In its
opinion ~t; Court said: I] is Lt m.trLSt Conjectur,,witn
scarcely a posi:,ili~y to support it, V.at , 1-fIdanror
t osc fru ,'r om iL rzceived tme bill, coul(, at any ti: 2
after tri transmission of t~t foreign bill of exciiege to
5alLimor ,,aavE. tiatn any efietual meas-ures eiL ier for
a.rrestin the svindler o T reclaij.inw t.:- billbou ;t and
paic for upon t-. credit of tei bill. .toppcis cannot e
based upon mere conjactures, evcu if a prupcr foundaion is
laid for t±-e, in oehT- r-sp cts. TuiF they tool to '
t L,- general rule, ar quo te. t ,e a ov I J nin a e f-o a New.
1
or ca, e.
In socakin T of Lie fargorr t.-e court clilgi, to L!e
j&nral rule anud says" All unaut;rrized p ayr.entc -u h as
upon forged ciaeccs are, i'-±or.,oa ; at ) uril A t i
bank,anai it is not justified in cuargin- c rery- a -ains t
1. W; itu vs. aix 6k K ' Nor' 322.
(deposito-'s account unl.,ss some neli,.nt act of his in
SI "Way COllLl'ibULzU L u IIcaLCz SluC -jih1! ill C fjil
instance,or uzless by iis suLsquenit conduct in reiatio2
t-o . ,tLer i s ,Pon erita le nciDi-.s e-tu.rJ. to
deny t:ie corr 2ctnes- of slcU yent. T i .. of :ie
law,, cannot well L que-tioned,anc i in(;s a~indert support
in t', decisiorirn of tie coirts.
A.t ... f tn - ....is vc i no te by te
ruporter~w..o a fr.es in ev\,ry particular .i t u rulin-
o-f t~±e California S-u-pr,._.a CoLrt, an: uot ,wi , approvl,
,art of t:,e (uicion in hardy vs. C- Esaue."e -II, 1
iS1d. 562.
In 7r?.Dc vs. Cierical National 3an, L- plaintiff
iepL a rnnin:: ac(count at t ie ban of L-le d> an:s. Tn
- -'f , of t:.ir c .ec boo i t-,- p1 alintiff ? -,ao
anua of all c~ic, s crawiy t-I. Iv' . -.. lin uiay a
bailti:c, V.' O ws ..rhc. A _-.:e.p r aw' y7 at u o i
and fo,'-e(! many c:, -cfus an(; ti.y wer: r: -,urned to the firm
on setLiin- day ty t .f t i.z c'.; . wer- r; .Lu r-
ne,. thie plaintiffs,wi'h t'.e ai ~tce of Lh'i boo,- '1:2kper
1. 4 N.Y. 209. 23 Al 1 any Law Journal 31.5.
woulu go over tau accounts anu coxniar t;i. canec.s wiL,± t;±
xarginal rmi _oranda. -y doctorin. L i, books ti i boo-ee-
per manajtgu to ueceive thie plaintiffs until tniirty four
forzd ciec., s had I.een paid by the banic and c are:J to the
account of plaintiffs before Lt forgery was disuovtT"u.
It was ;i.ld t -at t'ie plaintiffs could rece, ver. The co mt
said:"Tne principal tuat a ban,, 2anno pay out the money
of a ueposi'=r ancu debit tnenm to ui account is clear
enough. It Ta.es no difference that t e forgcry was com-
mitted by a confic;ential cler c of te depositerwiio by his
position %ad unu-ual facilitis for perpetrating tmt
fraud, ajrd i osinj tx' forj.d paper uipon t bank.----- but
w;,iti thn for>.c c:acs av bn pald; and cuar-td in ti
account and rturn. to ti± uepusilvr : is unc ter no uuty
to thi ban. to conuuct Lat exa-,iiation so tnaL it iill
necossurily luad to t:iz d-icover; of tfie frauu.
1
In the duarterly Law -,view thiere is a resume of
L e late English case of Vagliano vs. ianc of £nJland. itr.
Chalmers, t:i= au lor of Ltm article, s;._ys triat tis case"
affora- a good illusration of tae incertainty of law and
I. Vol 7. Page 217.
t! Aaleiuoscopi. naur of Le juaicial njinu. Taiis case
was apptale, aaL reversae. Thie court of first Instan-
ce decidin- with almost one voice for tie plaiIff,laed
tLe House of Lords wita almost equal unanimi ty reversed
the decision. The case was tris; The plaintiff was- a
customer of the 3ank of England and was in the iait of
accepting his bills paya-le t-.ere. A confidential clerk
forged drafts crawn on tie plaintiff and witaout discov-
ering the fraud ,ie accepted t;iem; to mae tne deeption
more perfect the cler. forged lItt rs of advice in t'v
namie of tfie suppos-u arawer. The money was piu t h LAe
forger'waio also forgeu tie payee 's signatur and ae
plaintiff brourit tais action to determine waetuir he,or
tne bang must stand tne loss. 'It was admitted taat, as
t, e plaintiff nad really accepeu brie Lills te could not
dispute t,;e urawers signature,but,iL was ur:,ed, tiere was
notning to przvtlit hi7 from settling up tn1 forgery of
the payee's inuorsement,t;,e Lan& tic1fore nad paid t'-e
bills to a person who could not give a discharge. of them,
and accordin.- to the principle of the decision in Robarts
i
vs. Tuccer ,they were not entitled to debit ,is accounts
wiL,, sucA pay':,Vl,. 
The 3an. ueifuded on two groun=s, (1), tnat t.ie plai-
tiff had estopped himself by his fro"ig"ne n settling
'" % 1 -1 :,l
bo Lt luracry,adlu (L) iJY Lk", iiiSll 3illf Of .C..angC
Act of 1882.
Two of the judges were of the opinion that tae plain-
tiff was estopped by negligence. The remainder of tce
Court who expressed their views were of tie opinion that
he was not estopped. None of ttie jud,tus threw any doubt on
t1, rule of law,wli establis;ied by previous cases, that in
order to cre=ate an estoppel by negligence,the negligence
relied on must have been the direct and proYir-ate cause of
the false signatures being taien as gei-iuine. "
But th ae main contention on tiie bill was on taie con-
struction of tnr- 3ills of' Excriangi e Act,wa:ich enacLeu Liat"
where the payee was a ficticious or non-existirg person
tae bill is payable to bearer." And it was !Aeld that the
payees were ficticious wit~ain the meaninI of t!ke Statue,
and that the Banm' was justified in paying t~e bills over
1. 16 aueens Bench 560.
its counter.
I will noL give t readoiin of'Li, Qcase u.u o-. u0
the points discussed was how t,%e payees wno were real and
natural persons could cease to be persons for t.iis one
purpose,and on this one bill become ficticious. Ti-e learn-
ed Rir.Chalmers says however that a French Count would
have ultimatuly arrived at tne same decision but by a
different course of reasoning.
The latest case in otr own State,that I have been
able to find,is Shipman vs. The 3ank of the State of New
1
Yorx. This '16e,i wuulu sUm, is a very imi/orLaiL one,
carefully distinuisied from the Vagliano decision, and
may be regardedI as tre latest and best autihority on this
branch. As O'Brien J. saio,in hic decision, it resembles
the Vagliano case more on account of the stupendousness
of the fraud and forgeries than for anything else. The
case was this; Tae plaintifis were a law firm in New Yu-r
doing a large business in real estate transactions. Over
this department of trieir businesF they plac1 one p dell,
who ha been long with the firm and enjoyed th eir confi-
1. 126 N.Y. 318.
uence to U1e higihst degrr. It is aairuary ri Lu
LU udaii L,. mair Li iiCi1 -bine wa, CofLhUuict_
or the manner in whici he carried out hi.r schemes. It is
sufficient to say triat he would draw chec.:s,mostly to fic-
titious payees,which thie plaintiffs would sign aau gie
to Bedell for delive--y. He would then forte the p-,yee's
name and draw the money. This was carriedJ on for some
four years anu he obtaineu a.out $225,00u. Only $2400.
was paid to 3edell by the defendants, -the rest was Uepqs--
iteu in oLaur banks and ultimately paid out by ttie uefen-
ua-nt, t rruoju t.ie clearing house in t r egular course of
business. Sixteen of tne cw1e: s w r payable to ficLic-
ious persons,and tne re:mainder to persons wrhos- names
Beuell utliberatly forged. When the periodical settlt-
ments witn Lte ban were madt 3edell aad principal c~iarge
of them, anu it was only through accidenL taat tau forger-
ies were at last uiscovered. uThe cuecis were paid in
every case by the defendant without any inquiry as to the
genuineness of tne indorsements,an(J in reliance upon the
responsil ility of the parties presenting the same and not
in rtliance on any tning donc or forborne by t~iu plain-
tiffs - except that they were sign by em.
*Payments made upon forged indorsements are at the
peril of the bankunless it can claim protection upon
some principle of estoppel or by some negligence chargalle
to Lae depositor. (Numerous cases are cit-u to subs tan-
tiate tnis proposi.ion).
"The law imposed no duty on the plaintiffs to do more
tnan tney did to determine whet]er Lhe indor-eerts on the
criecic were ,--nuin- The defendant's contract was to
pay te criecKs only upon genuine indorstment. Tiie drawer
is not prusumed to Know and, in fact, seldom dots know tue
signature of tne payee. The banL mut, at its own peril,
determine that question. It has the 'opoortunity by requir -
ing identification when the chiec., is przserted,or a re-
sponsible guaranty from tne party presenting it of ascer-
taining whetner the indorseme.-t is -enuine or not"
"There is not the Slightest reason to believe that if the
exa :ination was conductec by the plaintiftfh-x.,t 2.VS,
the result would have been any different".
It was claimed by tne defendant triat t,.e sixten
checks made payable to the order of non-existing persons
were in fact payable to bearer. And trat such was the in-
1
terpr;tation of tne language of tnle statue whicn says treat
paper payable to the order of a non-existiln Derson should
be treated as payable to b:earer as against tre maker and
all persons having Knowledge of the facts.
But on trils point the court held that the rule only
applied to paper put in circulation by the maker who knew
at the time tnat the person was ficticious. "The makers
intention is the controlling consideration which deter-
mines the character of such pacer'
In speaKing of the difference between the decision of
the Vagliano case and the case at bar the court said that
our statue in retard to ficticious payees was a cocifica-
tion of the co=,on law while the intention of the £nlish
Statue was to depart from it. And after carefully discuss-
ing and studying the English case they were convinced that
it was not an authority adverse to their decision in the
present case.
1. 1 R.S. 768.
In conclusion,it is hard, as Judge Barrett said, to
furmulaLt any one, inlexible rul of law to suit all the
.nU ucisions,or to be used as a guide in all possible
cases that may arise. It is safe, however, to say wita
Mansfielc and Story that the rule that a banK i supposed
to know the hanu-writing of its customers has never been
departeu from by any nigh tribunal. It is evident from
the foregoing pa.es that Judge 3arrettin 7 Abbott) tried
to override the old rule,but cecisions by the Court of
Appeals nave sincu faileu to bear hi: out. A laLt Cali-
fornia case, a late .ew York case,anf the Vagliano case all
seem to stick to the ol; rule. The decision in the Vagli-
ano case was ruaue partly in accordance witf a latt s,iL-
utory enactment,and that,in the opinion of Judgt O'Brien,
is the reason that it should be consideredas far as the
coiion law in it goes,as recogniz;ing the rule. New York,
in the case of Shipman vs. The New YorK State Bank, deciced
last year, still clings to tne Price vs. Neale decision, and
the 'jniteu States Courtsnave notas far as I 1i ave been
able o learn, ever substantially departed, from it.
It is true thiat te courts of some states art in con-
flict witai tie gcneral rule,but iL may b;.,as a wriLer in
The American Law Review suggestmore on -ccount of a mis-
conception of the rule,anu the application of it to cases
where the facts do not warrant it, t'iin in any trouble with
the rule. Mr. Morse and many other eninent writers lay it
down as a general proposition tnaL txu rule is now as good
as N.en d;clareu a j.-udreu years ajo; but tat tne general
tendency has been to"par . it cown" and to sE:ift t:-e lii-
bility wherever possible from the banx to the shoulders of
tie payee. But a bank is only to pay out t,: money of its
customer upon hi. order,and if they pay it upon the order
of some one tlse trney must U:ar tne loss unless they can
find the payee. Almost all the decisions quote wiLh ap-
proval the early cases an(J the lading cases in this
country. MIr. Chalmers said in discussing this- subject
that there are points which always ihave been and always
will be in controversy, and !,,r. Daniel is inclined to for-
mYlate a rule of his own rather than to sticic to the old
one. He thinks his better calculated to effectuate justie,
Judge O'i3rien does not regard tiit laut deciions in
Englanu, as far as Lniy ar, confiIu o e co;,,on law, and
independent of statute,as in any way contrary to te well
esablisheu doctrine. The difference Letween the English
law and the law of ouir own country is, that in ttae former
the statute rezardirr ficticious payees is construeO to
mean that if a person's name is usec. as a dumr.y payet. by
one who is perpetrating a fraud and forgery, the 'till will
be re-ardec as payable to bearer unless the m zer inew
that tle payee. was ficticious an(, intended the note as
negotiahle witnout indorsement before it lef; his hands.
I do not think that it is necessary to cite more
cases,or to lcer quote from utcisins. In ny opinion
tre rulewith some refinemn~ts,!still st .ns and while it
may in some cases seem to be uarsn, inf 1ribl anc unjust,
it woulc! be hard to wor- out any schieme a plic atle to all
cases, wnicn would be fairer.

